Theoretical, Empirical, and Potential Ideological Dimensions of Using Western Conceptualizations to Measure Muslim Religious Commitments

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One approach to promoting a Muslim psychology of religion involves a dialogical model of research. This model would bring Western social scientific understandings of religion and mental health into dialogue with Muslim perspectives. Concerns about bias in applying Western assumptions and methods to Muslim religiousness could be addressed through an empirical sensitivity to ideological factors. Support for this model may appear in the effort of Western psychologists to describe intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious motivations. These orientations roughly parallel, respectively, the experiential, utilitarian, and Gnostic types of Muslim religiousness described by the Iranian philosopher A. K. Soroush (2003). Studies using Muslim samples in Iran and Pakistan have confirmed the plausibility of this parallel and therefore the potential of the dialogical model.

Keywords dialogical model, ideology, Muslim psychology of religion, religious orientation, religious types

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INTRODUCTION

Issues relevant to Muslim mental health necessarily fall within the orbit of central religious concerns. El Azayem and Hedayat-Diba (1994) argued, for example, that “by following Islamic principles, Muslims can achieve and enjoy the four ingredients of a healthy and balanced life, namely, physical, social, mental, and spiritual health” (p. 49). They suggested that Muslim forms of prayer “guard against anxiety and depression,” fasting during Ramadan “fosters compassion for the hungry and enhances a sense of gratitude for God’s gifts of life,” and charity toward the unfortunate “alleviates hatred, enmity, and loneliness in the community” while encouraging “an emotional attitude of generosity and gratitude that is ... preventative against depression, guilt feelings and crime” (pp. 45–46).

Muslim mental health professionals therefore need conceptual frameworks for analyzing the religious functioning of clients. Foundations for such an analysis will necessarily rest on religious texts and traditions of interpretation, but other useful information could come through the development of a Muslim psychology of religion. The psychosocial aspects of religion are, after all, an empirical reality that can be studied using standard social scientific methodologies (Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003). Muslim social scientists could, for example, create psychological scales that operationalize basic dimensions of Islamic commitment. Those scales could then be used to clarify how individual differences in Muslim beliefs and practices correlate with mental health. The availability of such data presumably would be a very practical professional asset.

Previous difficulties in establishing a Muslim psychology of religion have suggested that formidable challenges await any effort to pursue such a research program (Moughrabi, 2000). Among other things, Western psychology of religion operates from assumptions about religion and science that can be deeply incompatible with an Islamic worldview (Murken & Shah, 2002). Two polarized responses to this problem seem logically possible. At one extreme, researchers might focus only on general features of religion as studied in the West and presuppose that such concepts can be applied without difficulty to Muslims. This “general” approach could fail to appreciate those unique aspects of Islam that are essential in defining a Muslim psychology of religion. At the other extreme, scholars might so emphasize the particularities of Islam that any application of outside perspectives could be dismissed automatically as irrelevant or misleading. This “particular” approach could miss important opportunities to benefit from legitimate insights that might be available within the contemporary psychology of religion.

Approaches that avoid these extremes could combine the strengths and avoid the liabilities of the general and particular options. A Muslim psychology of religion, for example, might be based on a dialogical model...
of development in which the general and particular features of religion are brought into conversation. Such a model could explore the productive possibilities of relating the two perspectives together, but would not rest on the presumed operation of a simple dialectic. In other words, a Hegelian synthesis would not necessarily result from bringing the thesis of the more general framework into relationship with the antithesis of the more particular perspective. Something like a synthesis might sometimes occur, but good grounds might also be discovered for rejecting aspects of the general based on the particular. Alternatively, dialogue could simply promote greater understanding by clarifying nonproblematic differences between the general and the particular. The potentials of such a model can be illustrated in preliminary efforts to relate general Western perspectives on religious motivation to the particulars of Muslim faith.

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND MENTAL HEALTH

Any effort to argue that religion is central to personal and social well-being must confront seemingly undeniable evidence that religion sometimes seems to be as associated with maladjustment as with adjustment. How can the presumed benefits of religion be explained within the context of its apparent liabilities and difficulties? Within the contemporary psychology of religion, efforts to answer that question have often focused on the motivations that individuals have for being religious.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientations

One influential attempt to explore the complex mental health implications of religion was initiated by the American psychologist Gordon W. Allport. In a book entitled *The Individual and His Religion*, Allport (1950) argued that the “religious sentiment” is associated with “neither rationality nor irrationality, but rather with a posture of the mind in which emotion and logical thinking fuse” (p. 18). This sentiment operates as “a mode of response wherein a combination of feelings is tied to a conception of the nature of things that is thought-provoking, reasonable, and acceptable” (p. 18). For Allport, this meant that “all the great religions of the world supply, for those who can subscribe to their arguments and affirmations, a world-conception that has logical simplicity and serene majesty” (pp. 18–19).

In analyzing religious sentiment, Allport attempted to define religious maturity (1950, pp. 59–83). A mature faith, he suggested, is “dynamic in character in spite of its derivative nature” and develops out of psychological immaturities; in other words, out “of organic unrest, of self-interested desire, of juvenile interpretation” (p. 72). Mature religion, nevertheless, moves beyond its immature origins and becomes “authoritative over the
motives from which it grew” (p. 72). With maturity, religion becomes the “master-motive” in a believer’s life and thus achieves a “functional autonomy” (p. 72) within the psychological dynamics of the individual.

Having decided that the religious sentiment is the best instrument for dealing with life, the self, as it were, hands over to it the task of interpreting all that comes within its view, and of providing motive power to live in accordance with an adequate frame of value and meaning, and to enlarge and energize this frame. (pp. 72–73)

As it functions in this manner, the mature religious sentiment becomes increasingly well differentiated in terms of conceptual “richness and complexity” (Allport, 1950, p. 65). A mature faith also encourages moral consistency, promotes the articulation of a comprehensive philosophy of life, and is harmoniously integrated within a meaningful pattern of understanding. Among other things, it also supplies the individual with heuristic beliefs. Such beliefs serve as a “working hypothesis” about life and make it possible to “act whole-heartedly even without absolute certainty” (p. 81).

Allport later turned his attention to empirically examining his theoretical perspectives on the religion by creating two Religious Orientation Scales (Allport & Ross, 1967). The Extrinsic Scale was essentially devised to measure a mentally unhealthy religious immaturity. With an extrinsic orientation, an individual is religious for “instrumental or utilitarian” purposes. Here, a “creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms, the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self” (p. 434). Religion is thus viewed as a means to other, more valued ends. Indeed, Allport’s basic assumptions about religious immaturity may be most obvious in the single Extrinsic Scale item, “Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life.” With an extrinsic faith, “temporal” realities are primary, and “spiritual” concerns are secondary.

The Intrinsic Scale was designed to assess religious maturity. With an intrinsic motivation, “other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, as far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed, the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). The intrinsic individual therefore is not motivated primarily to use religion for other purposes; instead “he lives his religion” (p. 434). An intrinsic orientation is illustrated in the self-report that “my religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life” (p. 437). With an intrinsic faith, “spiritual” realities are primary as the individual seeks to bring “temporal” concerns into conformity with a more faithful form of existence.
After publication of the Allport and Ross (1967) paper, numerous researchers began to use these two scales to study religious motivations. A vast literature emerged and most importantly uncovered substantial support for Allport's overall interpretation of religious motivation (Donahue, 1985). In other words, the supposedly more immature extrinsic orientation did in fact tend to predict poorer mental health, whereas the presumably more mature intrinsic orientation was, as expected, a frequent correlate of healthy adjustment.

Religious Orientation Types

Although generally supportive of Allport's description of religious motivations, this research literature, has nevertheless, been associated with numerous complexities; three deserve emphasis. The first appeared when Allport and Ross (1967) observed that some individuals paradoxically scored high on both motivations. How could someone be religiously mature and immature at the same time? According to Allport and Ross, such responding pointed toward the existence of four different religious orientation types. High scores on both scales theoretically pointed toward the responding of an indiscriminately proreligious type. This type was presumed to be relatively unsophisticated in blindly affirming most statements of faith. An intrinsic type self-reported high levels of only the Intrinsic Scale and was thought to exemplify a more truly mature and thoughtful form of commitment. With elevated responding on only the Extrinsic Scale, extrinsics followed a more purely utilitarian approach to religion. The indiscriminately antireligious type exhibited low levels of both scales and presumably engaged in a general rejection of all religion.

Numerous studies confirmed the validity of these religious orientation types (Donahue, 1985). In conformity with Allport's (1950) general assumptions about religious maturity, intrinsics tend to display the most consistent evidence of psychological adjustment whereas extrinsics appear to be the least adjusted. Mental health characteristics of the two indiscriminate groups often fall between these two other types, but also can display the strengths of intrinsics or the weaknesses of extrinsics, depending on which psychosocial characteristics are examined. In short, efforts to fully understand the mental health implications of religious motivations may need to remain sensitive to the existence of four different types of religious motivation.

Quest Religious Orientation

A second complexity emerged out of skepticism that the Intrinsic Scale fully recorded the religious maturity described by Allport (1950). Again, for Allport, the religious sentiment is ideally defined by “a conception of the
nature of things that is thought-provoking, reasonable, and acceptable” (p. 18). A mature faith is also “dynamic” and assumes “the task of interpreting all that comes within its view” (pp. 72–73). In other words, the religiously mature individual seeks meaning in life through an ongoing, open, and cognitively sophisticated attempt to make sense of experience in religious terms.

Critics have argued that the Intrinsic Scale failed to capture this cognitively complex element of religious maturity (e.g., Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993). Strong intrinsic associations with orthodoxy, for example, supposedly reveal a narrow-minded and rigid adherence to traditional beliefs. The claim has also been made that high scores on the Intrinsic Scale may merely reflect a defensive desire to maintain only the socially desirable appearance of being religious.

A Quest Scale was created to redress these kinds of problems. In three broad types of statements, this scale operationalizes “the degree to which an individual’s religion involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life” (Batson et al., 1993, p. 169). Some items express a motivation to explore existential questions in religious terms (e.g., “I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my world and in my relation to my world” [Batson et al., 1993, p. 170]). Others refer to an openness to change (e.g., “there are many religious issues on which my views are still changing”). A final group of statements assumes that an ability to doubt is essential to religious maturity (e.g., “questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers” [Batson et al., 1993, p. 170]).

The Challenge of Ideology

A third and final complexity may illustrate a more general problem within the psychology of religion. While the Intrinsic Scale may be especially sensitive to orthodox forms of commitment, the Quest Scale may instead reflect more progressive attitudes that include tendencies toward a rejection of traditional religion (Goldfried & Miner, 2002). It is difficult to understand, for example, how a sincere follower of most religious traditions could ever believe, “Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.” The more progressive Quest Scale and the more orthodox Intrinsic Scale measures may therefore reflect somewhat incompatible philosophical perspectives on religion. Such possibilities suggest that all empirical research in the psychology of religion may need to be framed within the broader context of an “ideological surround” (Watson, 1993, 1994, 2006).

As defined by MacIntyre (1978), “ideology” is a somewhat nonempirical belief system that has both normative and sociological implications. The belief that God created the universe, for example, is somewhat nonempirical
in that evidence can be developed both for supporting and for disputing this claim, but neither position can be proven or falsified scientifically. Beliefs about the existence or nonexistence of God are nevertheless accompanied by derivative normative assumptions about how life should be lived, and those assumptions necessarily define an individual sociologically as the member of one group or another. This circumstance will be true not only of the religious and nonreligious individuals that social scientists study, but also of the social scientists themselves. To say that empirical findings operate within an ideological surround is, therefore, to suggest that research in the psychology of religion will never achieve a fully neutral objectivity. All empirical findings will be the social construction of somewhat nonempirical, normative, and sociological perspectives that are unavoidably built into any research program.

Such a possibility in no way diminishes the importance of research. Indeed, the opposite may be true in at least two ways. First, a neutral objectivity may be impossible, but a balanced objectivity becomes a more defensible and achievable goal through greater research activity that reflects an increasingly diverse array of ideological perspectives. Muslim perspectives would, of course, need to be included within that array. Second, a more balanced objectivity could also result not only through empirical investigations into the psychology of a broader range of religions, but also through the empirical study of ideological influences on the psychology of religion. Numerous procedures have been devised for that purpose (Watson, 1993, 1994), but two are especially relevant to the assumptions underlying the quest religious orientation.

Are expressions of quest ideologically incompatible with traditional religious commitments? This question can be answered empirically by giving individuals a direct opportunity to evaluate Quest Scale items as either consistent or inconsistent with their personal religious beliefs. Interpretations of each item can then be analyzed to determine if statements are antireligious, proreligious, or neutral in their ideological implications. When these procedures are used, individuals displaying an Intrinsic type of commitment do in fact evaluate at least some statements from various Quest Scales as being ideologically antireligious (Watson, Morris, Hood, Milliron, & Stutz, 1998).

Ideology may influence not only religious measures, but also the psychological scales used to assess the mental health implications of religion. Positive correlations with the Budner (1962) Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale, for example, may seem to support the idea that the Intrinsic Scale records a narrowminded, cognitively rigid form of faith (Genia, 1996). But, is the Budner Scale ideologically neutral? One item states, for instance, “The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.” Many traditionally religious individuals could presumably believe such a thing and yet still have the psychological capacity to tolerate ambiguity. The Budner Scale
may simply fail to express intolerance of ambiguity in a language that is ideologically compatible with the adaptive potentials of religion.

This possibility can be tested directly in a procedure described as “empirical translation schemes” (e.g., Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood, 1995). Each Budner Scale statement can be “translated” into a more religious language that explicitly tries to express the adaptive potentials of faith, and then the original and translated items can be administered to a religious sample. A subset of translations did in fact correlate with the Budner and Intrinsic Scales in a manner demonstrating that traditional religious commitments do indeed include potentials that are incompatible with an intolerance of ambiguity (Watson & Morris, 2006). Therefore, within the psychology of religion, empirical assessments of mental health may also need to remain sensitive to ideological assumptions that may be built into all psychological instruments.

Dialogical Implications

In summary, research into intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious orientations may represent an opportunity for pursuing the “dialogical” development of a Muslim psychology of religion and mental health. Efforts to do so will surely need to remain sensitive to the fact that assumptions guiding the Western social sciences can be incompatible with Muslim perspectives (Murken & Shah, 2002). At least some Western approaches to religion and mental health will probably need to be rejected. Ideological surround procedures nevertheless should make it possible to use empirical methods to help determine when rejection may and may not be appropriate. “General” Western and “particular” Muslim perspectives on religious motivation may, however, support the creation of a dialectic that encourages the dynamic development of a Muslim psychology of religion. Preliminary support for such a possibility seems evident on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

MUSLIM THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION

Claims that individuals maintain different types of religious commitment are consistent not only with general Western perspectives in the psychology of religion, but also with Muslim traditions. This idea is consistent, for example, with the Qur’an (56:7–10), and with the manner in which Islamic mystics have envisioned the religious life (Chittick, 1983). Especially relevant to the contemporary psychology of religion, however, is the manner in which the Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush (2003) recently identified three types of Muslim religiousness. In articulating this typology, Soroush analyzed historical and political factors that remain largely beyond the development
of a Muslim psychology of religion. His utilitarian, Gnostic, and experiential forms of Muslim religiousness nevertheless suggest rough parallels with the Western religious orientation literature.

Utilitarian Religiousness

Utilitarian religiousness, Soroush (2003) argued, is outcome oriented and emphasizes participation in religious rituals and practices as a means to specific ends. This form of commitment reflects the instrumental rationality of a religion dedicated to achieving the good life, either in this world or in the next. Pursuit of otherworldly goals may occur, for example, through asceticism, whereas worldly objectives may be associated with politics and statesmanship, to mention two possibilities.

Utilitarian religiousness can be described as “hereditary” and “imitative” because it largely mirrors the religion of one’s parents and culture. Such origins promote a submissiveness in which the individual tends to be “obedient,” “traditional,” and “dogmatic.” Religious involvement is not based on the complexities of deeper personal understanding or experience, but instead is merely “habitual.” Religious “habits,” nevertheless, are centrally important in organizing a believer’s life, and disturbances in those habits can also produce “emotional” or “excitable” reactions. Overall, this form of religiousness rests on the assumption that true faith must be made manifest through action. Religious practices and rituals must be followed perfectly in order to maintain the dignity and identity of the utilitarian believer.

Soroush (2003) further argued that utilitarian religiousness revolves around the implicit metaphors of God as sultan and the Prophet as commander. Within this kind of thinking, believers become “slaves” who must follow orders, not for any spiritual reason, but rather as a means to some desired end. In other words, utilitarian believers follow “orders” so that they can receive some reward. Sin essentially becomes a failure to follow orders, and should be avoided, not because of any destructive influences it might have on the human heart, but rather because it will be punished. Matters of faith consequently tend to be reducible to “legalistic-juristic” considerations. The following of orders is simply what everyone should do. More profound considerations of morality become secondary.

Gnostic Religiousness

For those who maintain a Gnostic religiousness, the central implicit metaphor of the religious life is of God as a great puzzle or mystery to be solved. The Prophet becomes the teacher who must be studied in order to solve that puzzle. In this role, the Prophet is an exemplar of how rationality can move a believer closer to God. This means that the Prophet communicates primarily
with the person’s head, not with the person’s heart. The words of the Prophet express a symbolic or interpretative understanding of God. The Gnostic is the student who must learn what those words mean. The education offered by the Prophet has nothing to do with learning articles of faith that must be followed obediently, but rather is dedicated to helping students achieve the benefits of personal understanding and rational fulfillment.

Gnostic belief is, in short, organized around the theoretical rationality of a critical mind. This mind struggles with a mystery that defies definitive solution and cannot easily rest in a settled faith. Gnostic religiousness is antidogmatic, aspires to be nonideological in a Marxist sense, and is open to ideas from other perspectives. Constant questioning and criticism move the Gnostic believer to participate in religious practices, not in obedience to tradition, but rather as an expression of personal independence and individuality. Understanding of God, the Prophet, sin, and essentially all other religious concepts is in a constant state of flux. This means that Gnostic individuals can maintain fundamentally different understandings of religion at different times and can emphasize their differences with all other believers at the same time.

Gnostic religiousness is nonimitative and takes seriously the importance of choice and free will in determining personal faith. The ability to doubt is essential because it encourages pursuit of religious joy through rational achievement. At the broadest level, sin for those pursuing the Gnostic form of faith occurs through any uncritical acceptance of religious beliefs. Uncritical acceptance reflects the superstitious and vulgar religion of the masses. Any practices that lead the individual toward more sophisticated insights into the mystery of God define morality. Practices that move the individual in an opposite direction define immorality.

Experiential Religiousness

Experiential religiousness seeks an intimate closeness to God that other forms of commitment make impossible. The practical, often physical, concerns of instrumental rationality necessarily separate the utilitarian “slave” from God. Theoretical rationality crystallizes in a vast expanse of intellectual reflection that unavoidably distances the Gnostic thinker from God. For the experiential believer, God is an alluring object of adoration. The believer wants to “see” and, as directly as possible, experience God in order to love God.

This form of religion is “passionate,” “ecstatic,” and “mystical.” The Prophet becomes the ideal model of an ardent and confident lover that the experiential believer hopes to become. Participation in religious rituals and practices is not directed toward the achievement of an obedient self-control for the purposes of maintaining dignity and identity, nor toward the rational expression of personal independence and individuality. While
no doubt satisfying complex sociological and cultural functions, religious practices are most important for the role they play in producing the spiritual transformations that will move a believer closer to God. Meditative and other religious activities are essential because they bring the self into a freely chosen and further liberating relationship with God. Sin becomes anything that separates the heart of the lover from this kind of devotional relationship. Heaven becomes the joy of experiencing union with God; hell is the agony of being separated from God.

Experiential religiousness also differs from other forms of commitment in how different religions are sometimes evaluated. Implied in utilitarian religiousness is a blind obedience to the group that requires a disciplined communal rejection of all other religions. The never-ending questioning of rationality separates Gnostic believers from followers of their own faith, as well as from other faiths. Experiential religiousness displays more pluralistic tendencies. Across religions, God can be the shared, common object of desire and, when this is true, the experience of loving God will be the same. Religions may differ in how they achieve the spiritual transformations that bring a believer closer to God. The goal of those transformations nevertheless remains the same: a loving relationship with God. A famous saying associated with Islamic mysticism expresses this basic idea, “There are as many paths to God as there are breaths of people.”

Dialogical Implications

Soroush’s (2003) analysis of Muslim religiousness suggested rough parallels with the Western religious orientation literature. Utilitarian religiousness very much mirrors the extrinsic orientation in describing faith as a means to an end. The Gnostic emphasis on the positive roles of intellectual complexity and doubt in religious life clearly resemble themes associated with the quest orientation. Soroush focused on the passion and intimacy of experiential faith, but Allport and Ross (1967) described the intrinsic motivation largely in terms of values-related issues. Still, a not unreasonable hypothesis is that the intrinsic attempt to sincerely live religion rests on the ardor of an experiential love of God.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ORIENTATIONS

Formal theoretical reasons therefore exist for using general Western perspectives on religious motivation to encourage the dialogical development of a more particular Muslim psychology of religion. Further support for this dialogical model would appear in three broad types of empirical results. First, intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religious orientations should correlate reliably with measures of Muslim religiousness. Second, all three orientations
should display correlations with indices of psychosocial functioning that are at least somewhat similar to those observed in the Western research literature. Finally, unexpected findings and difficulties in using these Western measures should point toward the potential of a dialogical model to uncover particularities useful in developing a more specifically Muslim psychology of religion. Though the data are very preliminary, the studies using Iranian and Pakistani samples discussed below have yielded at least some evidence in support of all three lines of evidence.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientations

Full-scale and single-item indicators of the Allport and Ross (1967) instruments have been translated into Persian in Iran and into Urdu in Pakistan. English is widely spoken by a subset of the Pakistani population; therefore, measures expressed in English have been used there as well. In both translated and untranslated measures, statements were modified when necessary to make them more relevant to the Muslim experience. A number of Allport and Ross items, for example, refer to “church.” For Muslims, the obvious need was to substitute the word “mosque.” Single-item indicators of religious orientations used a 10-point rating scale and were based upon the findings of Gorsuch and McPherson (1989). As the best single indicator of the intrinsic orientation, these researchers recommended the self-report, “My whole approach to life is based upon my religion.” Kirkpatrick (1989) found that the Extrinsic Scale contained separate Extrinsic-Personal and Extrinsic-Social factors that have been observed in Iran as well (Ghorbani, Watson, & Mirhasani, in press). The most representative Extrinsic-Personal item was, “What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow.” Indicative of a Muslim Extrinsic-Social commitment was the assertion, “I go to the mosque mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there.” In Pakistan, the phrase “activities associated with my religion” was used instead of “mosque” because of gender differences in religious life. In some studies, only the full Extrinsic Scale or only the Extrinsic factors were examined.

Evidence supporting the use of the Allport and Ross (1967) orientations to encourage development of a Muslim psychology of religion has been observed in correlations with: (1) single-item ratings of Muslim religious interest, (2) scales recording specifically Muslim religious attitudes and beliefs, (3) self-reported mystical experience, and (4) measures of mental health.

Religious interest ratings simply asked participants to indicate how interested they were in religion along a 0 (not at all interested) to 9 (extremely interested) scale. In Iran, the Intrinsic orientation correlated robustly with Religious Interest (.71), and reliable associations greater than .32 were recorded for the Extrinsic-Personal and the Extrinsic-Social factors (Ghorbani,
Watson, Ghramaleki, Morris, & Hood, 2002). Strong and consistent Intrinsic correlations with Religious Interest were also observed in Pakistan (> .40), but only the Extrinsic-Personal factor displayed any significant association with Religious Interest, and then only occasionally (Khan & Watson, 2004, 2006a; Khan, Watson, & Habib, 2005).

Several measures of specifically Muslim beliefs have been examined. The Muslim Attitudes Toward Religion Scale (MARS) is a 14-item instrument that records basic Muslim beliefs, including such statements as “the supplication (dua) helps me,” “I believe that Allah listens to prayers,” and “I fast the whole month of Ramadan” (Wilde & Joseph, 1997). In Iran, the MARS correlated positively with both the Intrinsic (.67) and the Extrinsic (.31) Scales (Ghorbani, Watson, Ghramaleki, Morris, & Hood, 2000). The Intrinsic (.51) and the Extrinsic-Personal (.40) measures have also displayed reliable associations with the MARS in Pakistan (Khan et al., 2005). The Sahin and Francis (2002) Attitude Toward Islam Scale is a 21-item measure that builds on the MARS to offer a more comprehensive assessment of Muslim beliefs. In Pakistan, this scale displayed positive correlations with single-item indicators of the Intrinsic (.29) and the Extrinsic-Personal (.49) orientations (Khan & Watson, 2006b).

In Pakistan, a scale was created to assess specifically Muslim attempts to cope with personal problems and included such self-reported activities as “performed Nafl prayers to seek help from Allah,” “sought the company of righteous men close to Allah to obtain their dua for the solution of the problem,” and “gave Sadaqah in the name of Allah” (Khan & Watson, 2006a). The single-item Extrinsic-Personal (.21) and Extrinsic-Social (.26), but not the Intrinsic (.11), measures displayed small but significant correlations with these Muslim coping activities.

Another Pakistani investigation occurred during Eid-ul-Adha (Khan & Watson, 2004). Participants were asked to rate their interest in taking part in Eid-ul-Adha activities using a 0 (absolutely no interest)-to-9 (extremely high interest) rating scale. Eid-Interest correlated positively with the Intrinsic (.24) and Extrinsic-Personal (.21) single-item measures. Further analysis revealed that this full sample effect was explained solely by the responding of men, for whom the correlation was .45 with the Intrinsic and .27 with the Extrinsic-Personal orientations.

Correlations with mystical experience are especially noteworthy in exploring the suggestion of Soroush (2003) that experiential religiousness is “mystical.” Self-reported mystical experience has been examined in Iran using the Hood (1975) Mysticism Scale. This instrument operationalizes three factors described in the Stace (1960) philosophical analysis of mystical experience (Hood, Morris, & Watson, 1993). Perception of an ultimate void is recorded by the Introvertive Mysticism factor and appears in such self-reports as, “I have had an experience in which I had no sense of time and space.” Extrovertive Mysticism involves a consciousness of the “ultimate oneness
of all things” (Stace, p. 76), and is illustrated by the claim, “I have had an experience in which I felt everything in the world to be part of the same whole.” The Religious Interpretation factor records mystical experience as expressed in more explicitly religious terms. An illustrative item says, “I have had an experience which I knew to be sacred.” In Iran, the Intrinsic Scale correlated positively though not robustly with the Extrovertive (.18) and Religious Interpretation (.25) factors. In relationships of a similar magnitude, the Extrinsic Scale (−.22) and the Extrinsic-Social factor (−.15) correlated negatively with Religious Interpretation (Hood et al., 2001).

Simplest support for the dialogical model would occur in Muslim samples if the intrinsic orientation predicted adjustment and the extrinsic orientation maladjustment. Although complexities have appeared, numerous findings have linked the intrinsic orientation with healthier psychological functioning and extrinsic measures with more unhealthy functioning both in Iran (Ghorbani et al., 2000, 2002; Ghorbani et al., in press; Ghorbani & Watson, 2006; Watson et al., 2002) and in Pakistan (Khan & Watson, 2004; Khan et al., 2005). The one exception to this overall pattern has involved data for the Extrinsic-Personal factor, which occasionally has been associated with more adaptive psychological functioning (Khan et al., 2005; Watson et al., 2002).

The dialogical model would also receive some support if the Allport and Ross (1967) religious orientation types also proved to be valid in Muslim samples. This possibility was confirmed in Iran (Ghorbani & Watson, 2006). Participants who scored high on the Intrinsic and low on the Extrinsic Scales defined the intrinsic type and displayed the most consistent evidence of mental health and self-insight as measured by indices of alexithymia, emotional intelligence, self-consciousness, depression, and anxiety. Those who scored high on only the Extrinsic Scale (i.e., the extrinsic type) or low on both scales (i.e., the indiscriminately antireligious) were the most consistently maladjusted. These data, in other words, roughly paralleled findings reported with Western samples.

In short, numerous Iranian and Pakistani studies have confirmed that the Allport and Ross (1967) religious motivations seem to have at least some utility in promoting the dialogical development of a Muslim psychology of religion. Evidence for the Intrinsic Scale has been especially noteworthy. This orientation has correlated with at least some aspects of the mysticism that Soroush (2003) associated with experiential religion, has exhibited often robust linkages with numerous indices of Muslim religious commitment, and has generally predicted psychological adjustment. Extrinsic measures operationalize a form of commitment that seems very similar to Soroush’s utilitarian religiousness and have also predicted greater Muslim religious involvement, although such outcomes have been stronger and more consistent for the Extrinsic-Personal than for the Extrinsic-Social factor. As would be expected based on the Western research literature,
the Extrinsic Scale has been associated with poorer mental health, but the Extrinsic-Personal factor has sometimes been a correlate of adjustment (see Ghorbani et al., in press).

**Quest Religious Orientation**

Again, quest is designed to record the more cognitively complex form of faith that Soroush (2003) designated as Gnostic religiousness. Only two studies have explored this possible parallel, one in Pakistan (Khan et al., 2005) and one in Iran (Ghorbani et al., in press). Quest failed to correlate with the MARS or Religious Interest in Pakistan, although small linkages were observed with the Intrinsic (.16), Extrinsic (.34), and Extrinsic-Social (.21) orientations. Zero-order and partial correlations controlling for the Extrinsic Scale also uncovered Quest associations with self-reported empathy that suggested similarities to complexities observed in the Western research literature. In Iran, Quest was associated with slightly higher levels of the Intrinsic (.16), but not the Extrinsic (.10) orientation. Similar-sized Quest correlations also appeared with empathic concern (.16), empathic perspective-taking (.23), openness to experience (.20), and a need for cognition (.27). These outcomes very generally conformed to previous Western research, and associations with openness to experience and with a need for cognition in particular offered support for the parallel with Soroush’s interpretation of Gnostic religiousness in terms of rational processes. In short, preliminary data do suggest the usefulness of examining Quest in Muslim samples, but additional studies are clearly needed and are currently under way.

**DIALOGICAL COMPLEXITIES AND CONCLUSIONS**

Within a dialogical model, the assumption is not that any one particular religious tradition will be fully reducible to more general conceptualizations of religiousness. The hope instead is that a conceptual and empirical dialogue between a specific religious tradition and other religious and nonreligious perspectives will promote greater understanding both within and between perspectives. Illustration of that possibility now seems apparent even in the very preliminary research that has examined Western measures of religious orientation within a Muslim context.

Evidence suggests, for example, that Western religious orientation measures may be relevant to the typology of religiousness that Soroush (2003) has articulated largely in terms of his analysis of Muslim traditions. The extrinsic orientation describes at least some aspects of a utilitarian faith and can correlate with various measures of Muslim religiousness. In Muslim samples, the Quest Scale predicts more cognitive forms of psychological functioning as would be expected of a Gnostic religiousness. Consistent
associations with measures of Muslim religiousness and at least some linkage with self-reported mystical experience suggest a parallel between the intrinsic orientation and experiential religiousness.

At the same time, however, many of these statistically significant correlations were weak. Even these small magnitude relationships were nevertheless suggestive in illustrating the potential of the dialogical model. Western research into religious motivations is vast and contains innumerable implications that can enrich and encourage research into Islam and other religions. Studies using the Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Quest Scales therefore can be one useful place to begin the development of at least some aspects of a Muslim psychology of religion, but they are by no means the place where such efforts should end. The Soroush typology and other Islamic frameworks will surely supply invaluable clues for understanding how to create even more predictive and revealing tradition-specific indices of Muslim motivations for being religious.

A further advantage of the dialogical model may be that findings obtained within one religious tradition may uncover insights deserving attention by researchers working outside that tradition. In Pakistan, for example, translators attempting to express the Extrinsic-Social orientation in Urdu often found the ideas underlying this measure to be offensive to their faith (Khan & Watson, 2004; Khan et al., 2005). A later analysis of mean responding per item demonstrated that the Pakistani Extrinsic-Social motivation was in fact lower than the Intrinsic and Extrinsic-Personal orientations. Previously published Iranian and American findings and more recent Iranian data have confirmed this same pattern elsewhere (Ghorbani et al., in press; Watson et al., 2002). Among other things, such results may reveal that Western understandings of the Extrinsic-Social motivation may be biased and may fail to appreciate the positive possibilities of a social extrinsicness that is perhaps illustrated in Muslim commitments to create a compassionate ummah (Khan et al., 2005, p. 57). Difficulties in applying the Extrinsic-Social construct to Muslim samples therefore proved to be helpful in dialogically clarifying a measure that had been in use for decades in the West.

Also relevant to the Extrinsic Scale are Pakistani studies in which the Extrinsic-Personal orientation has consistently proved to be stronger than the Intrinsic and Extrinsic-Social motivations (Khan & Watson, 2004; Khan et al., 2005). A similar pattern sometimes, although not always has occurred in Iran, but perhaps has not in occurred the United States (Ghorbani et al., in press; Watson et al., 2002). In addition, the Extrinsic-Personal orientation sometimes predicts relative mental health in Muslim samples (Ghorbani et al., in press; Khan et al., 2005; Watson et al., 2002). Along with the unexpected findings for the Extrinsic-Social factor, these data may reveal a need to modify the wholly negative Allport and Ross (1967) assessment of the extrinsic motivation and to support previous suggestions that the extrinsic motivation
may include adaptive as well as maladaptive potentials (Pargament, 1992). Eventual demonstration that extrinsic and intrinsic motivations can both be associated with adjustment would seem to be in general conformity to the suggestion that “Islam, at its core, makes no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal” (Moughrabi, 1995, p. 72; see also Murken & Shah, 2002). With the availability of more adaptive extrinsic measures, the indiscriminately pror eligious rather than the intrinsic type might prove to be most consistently adjusted in Muslim samples (Ghorbani & Watson, 2006, p. 307).

Finally, any dialogical development of a Muslim psychology of religion needs to take seriously all concerns that Western social scientific approaches to religion may be insensitive to or inappropriate for exploring the Islamic faith (e.g., Murken & Shah, 2002). Useful here may be a realization that social scientific assumptions can be problematic even when applied to Western forms of religiousness (Watson, 2006). The existence of such problems, however, should encourage rather than discourage additional research effort. Associated with the ideological surround model of the relationship between psychology and religion is an attempt to use social scientific methods to clarify the possible biases and limitations of social science itself (e.g., Watson, 1993). Biases and limitations can be built not only into measures of religiousness, but also into operationalizations of mental health (e.g., Watson, 1994; Watson & Morris, 2006). Methods that explicate the ideological dimensions of research therefore may play an essential role in creating a dynamic and truly Muslim psychology of religion and mental health. This and many other possibilities await the invaluable research contributions that Muslim scholars will make to future understandings of their own and of other religious traditions.

REFERENCES


